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I    Introduction 
A vibrant literature has developed among applied economists seeking to quantify the impacts of 
risk on production decisions. This highly technical literature has relied on advanced econometric 
techniques to back risk preferences out of observed input decisions, assuming expected utility 
maximization. Expected utility theory attributes risk aversion entirely to the curvature of the 
utility function. Empirical applications seek to determine the level of curvature that best 
describes the input decisions. The outcomes of such estimation rely heavily on the assumption of 
expected utility maximization. Such anomalies as the certainty effect – where one discounts 
uncertain outcomes more than the probability would imply – could therefore cause severe bias in 
risk aversion estimates. 
As highlighted by Rabin (2000) and Just and Peterson (2003), an absurd degree of 
curvature is required to rationalize many individuals’ responses to relatively small gambles. 
While prospect theory is a compelling alternative explanation for decisions involving small 
gambles, it leaves one intriguing anomaly unexplained: why don’t standard measures of risk 
aversion change much when moving between small gambles?  
In this paper we propose an analytical and empirical distinction between average risk 
aversion – as captured by an individual’s valuation of a single, stand-alone gamble – and 
marginal risk aversion – as captured by an individual’s change in valuation between two 
gambles. After defining these concepts and deriving analytical estimation approaches for each, 
we use experimental data that includes individuals’ valuation of gambles with different 
probability distributions to demonstrate the distinction between average and marginal risk aversion. We then explore the relationship between the two and discuss implications for 
empirical risk research.  
The conceptual distinction between average and marginal risk aversion is simple. 
Average risk aversion is displayed when an individual’s certainty equivalent for a gamble is 
below the expected value. Marginal risk aversion, on the other hand, is displayed when the 
difference in certainty equivalents for a pair of gambles is less than the increase in expected 
value. We derive simple measures of both types of risk aversion and apply these measures to 
data collected from an economic experiment conducted among Indian farmers in the state of 
Tamil Nadu. In this experiment, farmers stated their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for several 
different payoff distributions. Because farmers faced these payoff distributions sequentially, we 
can directly infer average risk aversion and marginal risk aversion, respectively, from their WTP 
for a given payoff distribution and from the change in their WTP when moving from one 
distribution to another. To provide nontrivial incentives, total payoffs in the experiment were 
calibrated so that expected earnings exceeded the local daily wage rate; several farmers earned 
twice this rate.  
Our derived measures provide evidence that many Indian farmers are simultaneously 
average risk averse and marginal risk loving. This seemingly-contradictory behavior is consistent 
with the certainty effect and many other well known and robust anomalies in risk behavior. 
Importantly, it is impossible to reconcile this behavior with a single value function as suggested 
by expected utility or prospect theory. Given the values chosen for our experiment, such a 
function would need to be both concave and convex over the same range. 
This empirically-relevant distinction between average and marginal risk aversion has 
several key implications for the estimation of risk behavior. For example, imposing a utility functional form to estimate a global utility of wealth function will produce nonsensical results 
when average and marginal risk aversion differs. Estimates in such a context must try to account 
for both local convexity and global concavity of the utility function. This may explain many of 
the seemingly contradictory results found in the applied literature.  
 
II   Literature Review 
The certainty effect commonly occurs when individuals must choose between some certain 
outcome and at least one risky choice. Individuals behave as if the probability assigned to the 
sample space for the risky choice do not sum to one. Consider the following problems due to 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  
 
Problem 1
1: Choose between  
A:   2500 with probability .33    B:   2400 with certainty   
  2400 with probability .66 
  0 with probability .01 
 
Problem 2:  Choose between 
C:  2500 with probability .33     D:   2400 with probability .34 
  0 with probability .67       0 with probability .66 
 
Of 72 subjects, 82% chose B, while 83% chose C.  Each of these lotteries can be written 
as the combination of two lotteries. I will use the standard notation for a lottery, (X1, P1,..., Xn, 
Pn), where Xi represents the amount of money associated with outcome i, that is realized with 
probability Pi. Lottery A can thus be written as LA = .34(2500, 33/34, 0, 1/34) + .66(2400, 1). 
Lottery B can be written as LB= .34(2400, 1) + .66(2400, 1). Lottery C can be written as LC = 
.34(2500, 33/34, 0, 1/34) + .66(0, 1). Finally, Lottery D can be written as LD = .34(2400, 1) + 
.66(0, 1). According to the independence axiom, we can eliminate the addition of common 
                                                 
1 All values are Israeli sheqels. lotteries when making choices, so that the choice between A and B; and C and D should be the 
same as the choice between (2500, 33/34, 0, 1/34) and (2400, 1). However, for the majority of 
subjects (more than 65%), the addition of common lotteries causes a change in their preferences 
between the two lotteries.   
Behavior evident from problems 1 and 2 above have lead researchers to believe that 
individuals may discount the risky choices (A, C and D) below the level implied by expected 
utility giving an edge to the certain choice B. The certainty effect can be found when a choice 
between lotteries, one being a certain outcome and the other a lottery with greater expected 
value, is compared to the same lotteries compounded with another lottery which receives a 
majority of the weight. When presented with the compound lottery, the differences in 
probabilities for the best outcome becomes disproportionately small in the minds of individuals 
choosing between the lotteries. The certainty effect is pervasive and has been found by many 
independent studies (for another example see MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979). Additionally, 
several have observed that violations tend to occur more often in choices involving probabilities 
near 1 or 0 (Camerer, 1995).  
The certainty effect implies that individuals may exaggerate risk averse behavior when 
certain outcomes are available (e.g., in considering a lump sum contract) relative to when 
making marginal trade-offs in risk (e.g., allocating land between several crops).  
The over weighting of certain events has lead many to hypothesize that individuals work 
to minimize expected disappointment – the feeling of loss associated with having made the 
wrong choice ex post, rather than maximize expected return (see Gul, 1991). This means that 
individuals will give up large expected value prospects when a certain alternative is available 
given substantial downside risk. Alternatively, the individual may give up a high value certain outcome if given the chance for a risky gamble with relatively low probability of high value 
outcomes. Thus the individual may use the tails of the payout distribution of risky gambles as a 
reference point for decision-making, similar to the notion of prospect theory. 
Preston and Barrata (1948) were the first to note that individuals misperceive 
probabilities in choosing between risky outcomes. They ran auctions for various simple gambles 
– gambles in which there was a fixed probability of winning an amount of money. With 
regularity, they found that individuals would bid more than expected value for low probability 
wins (below 0.25), and under expected value for higher probability wins.  The effect was robust 
when the experiment was run on Ph.D. statisticians and other academics highly familiar with 
probability measures.  This effect was exaggerated when more individuals were involved in the 
auction. Edwards (1953) confirmed these results using individual choices instead of auctions.  
This result, that small probabilities are over-weighted and large probabilities are 
underweighted, is one of the most robust results in risk experiments, and has formed the basis for 
several models (e.g., Hong’s, 1983, weighted utility and Kahneman and Tversky’s, 1979, 
prospect theory among others).  Lattimore, Baker and Witte (1992) find that probability 
distortions seem to be dependent upon the absolute level of payoffs involved, with higher values 
yielding a higher fixed point. At a very rough level, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) find that the 
weighting function differs between gains and losses. 
 
III    Marginal and Average Risk Aversion 
Identifying risk preferences using production decisions is a difficult business. Problems occur 
primarily because one cannot observe the probability distributions used by the decision maker 
(see Holt and Chavas, 2001; Lybbert and Just, 2007). These concerns are only further compounded if we assume that individuals distort the probabilities according to some arbitrary 
function (Just and Just, in submission). The crux of the probability weighting literature is that 
individuals discount uncertain outcomes in some way that does not directly affect choices 
between similar risky outcomes. If this is the case, estimates of risk aversion parameters 
assuming expected utility will be biased.  
Consider the case where a farmer must allocate land between two crops (following Marra 
and Carlson, 1990). The farmer’s decision could be written as  
  ( )
1
11 2 1 max
LLEUL L Lw
≤
⎡ ⎤ Π+ Π − + ⎣ ⎦  
This problem will have first order condition given by  
  () ( )() 11 2 1 1 2 '0 EU L L L w ⎡⎤ Π+ Π − + Π − Π= ⎣⎦ . 
To estimate the above relationship, we would need to learn the parameters of the distributions of 
profit for an acre of each crop as well as parameters of the utility function, using data initial 
wealth, the amount of land utilized for each crop, and some calculation of profit per acre. In 
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Let us suppose that land devoted to production activity 2 achieves a certain return (this 
could represent leasing out the land or placing it in conservation reserve). Then, the first order 








= , where  A R  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If instead, the individual used a probability 
weighting function, the perceived mean would be diminished and the perceived variance would 
be lower. Let the perceived profit, and variance be given by  11 0 γ Π −> , 
2
11 0 ση −> . The true 
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Estimating (1) when (2) is the true relationship should bias the estimated level of absolute risk 
aversion. 













Thus our estimate may be higher or lower than the truth depending on the sign of the first term in 
the denominator.  The sign of estimated risk aversion will be wrong if  112 γ >Π −Π .   
The above decision functions reflect the risk aversion embodied by a single decision 
resulting from global risk – what we will call average risk aversion. Define  an average risk 




≡−  where WTP is the willingness to pay for a gamble defined 
implicitly as  () ( ) 00 EU x WTP w U w −+ = , where  x is the risky outcome and  0 w  is the initial 
wealth, and EV is the expected value of the risky outcome. Thus defined, this indicator is 
interpreted much like RA, namely  0( 0 ) aI R >< indicates an individual who is average risk 
averting (loving). Given probability distortion, however, these two measures of risk aversion 
may actually have opposite signs – i.e., a risk loving individual with  0 A R <  may behave as an 
average risk averter with  0 aI R > , as illustrated by equation (2). Thus, discounting all risky 
choices can impact decision functions in a way that may obscure the underlying risk preferences. Suppose now that we were to estimate using changes in production decisions when the 
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If we estimated (4) when (5) was the true model, we would again bias our estimate of risk 
aversion, but now in a different way  
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In this case, the estimate of risk aversion must have the correct sign, though the estimated 
coefficient will in general be biased downwards.  
To derive an indicator of marginal risk aversion, we focus on changes in EV holding 
variance constant and changes in variance holding EV constant. In the first case, we take 
WTP EV Δ< Δ as evidence of marginal risk aversion. In the second case, we take  0 WTP σ ΔΔ <  
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where RmI is interpreted much like RA and RaI: positive (negative) values indicates an individual 
is marginal risk averting (loving). Again, this should produce an estimate of risk aversion that is 
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where  η Δ< Δ . 
The previous two equations imply 















Such behavior is important in practice because the fixed effects of risk enter into the 
standard first order conditions as in (2). Thus, the common approach using first order conditions 
will produce estimates that are not predictive of how behavior will change given changes in the 
parameters of the distribution of profits or other production characteristics. Rather, these 
estimates will be highly biased and potentially imply risk averse behavior when in fact the 
underlying behavior is risk loving on the margin. Alternatively, estimating using observed 
changes in behavior, though it will not allow us to identify the distortion of probabilities, should 
lead us to operationally more accurate predictions of farmer behavior. 
  
IV Data 
This article uses data from the Salem and Perambalur districts of Tamil Nadu state, India (see 
figure 1). These data were collected with local support from Tamil Nadu Agricultural University 
and funding from the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Program (USAID-Cornell University). 
Ten enumerators surveyed 290 households in three Perambalur villages (Annukur, Pandagapadi, 
and Namaiyur) and three Salem villages (Vellaiyur, Kilakku Raajapalayam, and Kavarparnai). The team collected data in two parts. In the first part, enumerators administered a detailed 
household questionnaire focused on farmers’ management decisions, valuation of seed traits, risk 
exposure and wealth. In the second part, the team conducted experiments with farmers to elicit 
their valuation of hypothetical yield distributions. Farmers earned money (Rupees (Rs)) 
according to their performance in the experiment.  
The experiment consisted of a series of hypothetical farming seasons. At the beginning of 
each season, farmers were offered a ‘seed’ with a known Rupee-payoff distribution. This 
distribution was explained simply and repeatedly and shown graphically in order to facilitate 
farmers’ understanding of the payoff distribution implied by a given ‘seed.’ The distribution of a 
particular ‘seed’ was represented by 10 chips in a small black bag. There were three colors of 
chips, each representing a ‘harvest’ payoff: blue (high), white (average), and red (low). The 
distribution was modified by changing the proportion of blue, white and red chips in the bag. 
Farmers’ valuation of the seed was elicited using an open-ended question and the well-known 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak 1964). As 
shown in figure 2, we focus on four payoff distributions from the experiment: a benchmark base 
distribution (B), a high distribution with a higher mean payoff (H), a low distribution with a 
lower mean payoff (L), a stabilized distribution with lower variance (S). For the purposes of this 
paper we ignore the truncated distribution shown on the right. Figure 2 shows the marginal 
probability distributions and the expected value (EV), standard deviation (σ) and skewness (sk) 
for each of these distributions.
2 Every farmer valued each of these payoff distributions several 
times, first during practice rounds then in a final high stakes round.  
                                                 
2 These simple typological distributions where chosen to facilitate farmers’ understanding of the experiment. We 
used simple pictures like those in figure 2 to capture each distribution and explain the experiment to farmers.  To control for learning and ordering effects, all farmers started and ended with the 
benchmark distribution B (denoted B1 and B2, respectively), between which distributions H, L, 
S, and T were randomly ordered (see Lybbert 2004 for more details about the experiment). These 
data have been used elsewhere to assess poor farmers’ valuation of pro-poor seeds and to explore 
the strengths and weaknesses of field experiments as a methodology in conducting policy-
relevant research (Lybbert 2006).  
 
V Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the average and marginal risk aversion indicators defined above. We 
first present descriptive statistics based on these indicators, then compare the two indicators in an 
effort to detect deviations and patterns between average and marginal risk aversion, which are 
implicitly assumed to be the same whenever a single globally concave utility function is invoked.  
  According to Table 1, generally a majority of individuals in our data are average risk 
averse according to our indicator RaI. The one exception is for gamble L, which was the only one 
that involved losses. This may result from simple anchoring and adjustment mechanisms, 
whereby individuals anchor on their WTP for the base gamble, and then fail to adjust sufficiently 
up or down when valuing the alternatives. In the experiment, we presented the B distribution as 
the baseline distribution (as explained above), and all other distributions were presented 
sequentially as variations of this baseline distribution. It is therefore natural to compute marginal 
risk aversion based on how a distribution and WTP changes relative to the B distribution. This 
behavior is similar to those supposed by prospect theory. In this case, however, there is a 
reference gamble rather than a reference point. From Table 1, the percentage of marginal risk 
averse individuals, based on RmI, is shown for these gamble pairings. In all cases, fewer individuals were marginal risk averse than were average risk averse. In the case of the S 
distribution, a majority of individuals are average risk averse, and a majority is simultaneously 
marginal risk loving.  
  Next, we use kernel regressions to analyze whether there are any distinct patterns in 
differences between average and marginal risk aversion as captured by our indicators. 
Specifically, these regressions use an Epinechnikov kernel to map the nonparametric relationship 
between marginal risk aversion for (i-Bj), i={H,L,S} and j={1,2} and average risk aversion for 
distributions i and j. These regressions are shown in Figures 3 and 4 and include a scatterplot of 
these indicators. Based on the definitions of our indicators RaI and RmI, the positive (negative) 
quadrant of these graphs contains all individuals who were risk averse (loving) both on average 
and at the margin. The other quadrants contain individuals who were simultaneously risk averse 
and risk loving.   
  The general pattern of behavior is consistent with our notion of a reference gamble. In 
this case, we see that marginal risk aversion is negatively related to average risk aversion over 
the base gamble, but positively related to average risk aversion for all other gambles. This is 
evidence that the individuals’ WTP for all gambles were anchored on their WTP for the base 
gamble. Moreover, the relationship of marginal to average willingness to pay for the non-
reference gambles is surprisingly a relatively stable relationship, illustrated by the nearly straight 
curves resulting from the kernel regression. Further, the regression curves in the three right hand 
side panels are of nearly the same location and slope, though the ranges of average risk aversion 
on the horizontal axis is different for each gamble.  If this relationship holds true more generally, 
estimation of marginal and average risk aversion resulting from a pair of gambles could be 
predictive of the measures of risk aversion over a wide range of gambles.   
VI Discussion 
In this paper we differentiate between marginal and average risk aversion. Marginal risk aversion 
embodies the changes in behavior observed when the underlying gambles change. Average risk 
aversion is embodied by the behavior observed for a single gamble. Empirical work has focused 
solely on average risk aversion, and its impacts on production and other behaviors. Well 
documented behavior anomalies suggest that average risk aversion measures will not be 
predictive of behavior when underlying risky choices change. This may result from probability 
weighting, or from reference based behavior. Rather, we suggest that marginal risk aversion 
measures will be more robust to estimation bias, and have a greater ability to predict behavioral 
changes. The results of our experiment confirm strong differences between marginal risk 
aversion and average risk aversion, depending primarily on how the gamble is adjusted from a 
reference gamble. We find remarkable regularity in the relationship between marginal risk 
aversion and average risk aversion across a set of several gambles. Average risk aversion 
measures display unreasonable variation across gambles, undermining the researchers ability to 
predict behavior in one gamble from that in another relying solely on average risk aversion 
measures. We conclude that future empirical work should focus on obtaining measures of 
marginal risk aversion, potentially making use of the widening array of matching techniques 
from the econometric literature. Such estimates stand a greater chance of capturing general 
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Figure 1 Map of surveyed villages in Salem and Perambalur districts of Tamil Nadu (TN), India 








Figure 2 Marginal probability distributions for distribution types used in 
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Figure 3 Kernel regressions of marginal risk aversion indicator (RmI) relative to distribution B on 
average risk aversion indicator (RaI)  
 Table 1 Percent of individuals who are average and marginal risk averse  
Distribution
% Average Risk 
Averse (R aI>0) Δ Distribution
% Marginal Risk 
Averse (R mI>0)
B 69%
H 89% H - B 81%
L 23% L - B 10%
S 74% S - B 49%
N= 290 290  